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We examined the distribution of genetic mutations associated
with resistance to the M2 ion channel–blocking adamantane
derivatives, amantadine and rimantadine, among H5N1 vi-
ruses isolated in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Hong Kong, and China. More than 95% of the viruses iso-
lated in Vietnam and Thailand contained resistance muta-
tions, but resistant mutants were less commonly isolated in
Indonesia (6.3% of isolates) and China (8.9% of isolates),
where human infection was recently reported. The dual mu-
tation motif Leu26Ile–Ser31Asn (leucinerisoleucine at aa 26
and serinerasparagine at aa 31) was found almost exclusively
in all resistant isolates from Vietnam, Thailand, and Cam-
bodia, suggesting the biological selection of these mutations.
Avian influenza H5N1 viruses have caused repeated disease
outbreaks in poultry in Asia since 2003. Outbreaks have oc-
curred most recently in central Asia and parts of Europe [1].
Long-term endemicity of H5N1 viruses in Asia has led to the
evolution of multiple genetic and antigenic sublineages, and
regular control measures may be ineffective in the eradication
of H5N1 viruses from poultry [2, 3]. Human infection has
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been reported in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia, and more
recently in Indonesia, China, Turkey, and Iraq [4, 5]. The H5N1
virus, or a derivative of it, could become the next pandemic
influenza virus [6].
The World Health Organization has recommended prepar-
edness for a potential H5N1 influenza pandemic caused by
currently circulating H5N1 viruses. There is concern that an
effective vaccine might not be available in quantities sufficient
to counter this virus if it mutates to cause human-to-human
transmission. In the absence of an effective, widely available
vaccine, protection in the face of a pandemic would rely largely
on the prophylactic and therapeutic properties of antiviral treat-
ment. This reliance on treatment places emphasis on the stock-
piling of antiviral drugs, particularly of those for which resis-
tance is not regularly detected [7].
Currently available anti-influenza drugs include the ada-
mantanes (amantadine and rimantadine, which block the ion
channel formed by the M2 protein and inhibit early stages of
virus replication) and the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir
and zanamivir. Some clinical isolates of human influenza vi-
ruses and the majority of H5N1 viruses isolated from humans
and poultry in Vietnam and Thailand show resistance to the
adamantanes [3, 8–10]. Given the uncertainty about its ther-
apeutic value, amantadine is not stockpiled as frequently as
other antivirals are, in preparation for a pandemic. However,
it is not known whether resistance to amantadine is prevalent
in H5N1 viruses outside of Vietnam and Thailand. The in-
creasing genetic diversity of H5N1 viruses in affected areas
prompted us to analyze the geographic distribution of aman-
tadine-resistance mutations.
Materials and methods. The genetic sequences of the M2
ion channel protein of the matrix gene of 638 H5N1 viruses
of human and avian origin (191 virus sequences were obtained
from the Influenza Sequence Database [11], and 447 were gen-
erated in our laboratory) were analyzed as described elsewhere
[10]. The M2 sequences of an additional 220 H9N2 viruses
from China (158) and Hong Kong SAR (62) were randomly
selected from our database (186) and the Influenza Sequence
Database (34) and were similarly analyzed. Substitution of res-
idues Leu26, Val27, Ala30, and Ser31 of the M2 ion channel
protein were used to screen for predicted amantadine-resistant
mutants [12]. Amantadine resistance was assessed in an MDCK
cell-based virus reduction assay. Briefly, triplicate MDCK mono-
layer cultures in 96-well format were infected with 100 TCID50
of virus, then cultured in the presence of amantadine hydro-
chloride (Sigma) at concentrations of 10 nmol/L to 500 mmol/L
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Table 1. Distribution of amantadine-resistant mutants among H5N1 viruses isolated in affected Asian
countries, 1996–2005.
Source Leu26Ile Val27Gly/Val27Ala/Val27Ile Ala30Ser Ser31Asn
Leu26Ile
and Ser31Asn
Hong Kong SAR (n p 231) 1 16a 9 33 1
China (n p 123) 0 5b 0 11 0
Vietnam (n p 175) 160 1 1 160 160
Thailand (n p 58) 58 0 0 58 58
Indonesia (n p 32) 0 0 0 2 0
Cambodia (n p 9) 9 0 0 9 9
Malaysia (n p 2) 2 1 0 2 2
Japan and Korea (n p 8) 0 0 0 0 0
NOTE. Data are no. of isolates with given mutation(s). A total of 638 virus isolates were analyzed; of these, 39 were from
human, and 599 were from birds.
a Of these 16, 2 had Val27Gly, and 14 had Val27Ala.
b Of these 5, 4 had Val27Ile, 1 had Val27Ala.
Figure 1. Prevalence of amantadine-resistant mutants among H5N1 viruses isolated in Vietnam, Hong Kong, and China during different years. All
Thai viruses studied were isolated during a single year (2004), which precluded their inclusion in this analysis.
for 48 h; hemagglutination titers of individual well supernatants
were then tested in duplicate.
Results. As reported previously [3, 10], viruses containing
the M2 Ser31Asn mutation predominated among H5N1 isolates
from humans and poultry in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cam-
bodia. Of the 175 available isolates from Vietnam, 160 con-
tained the Ser31Asn mutation, whereas Val27Ala and Ala30Ser
mutations were rarely observed (1 of each was found) (table 1).
All isolates from Thailand (58/58) and Cambodia (9/9) contained
the Ser31Asn mutation. A Leu26Ile mutation was observed in
all isolates from these 3 countries that contained the Ser31Asn
mutation. To our knowledge, this is the first report of a Leu26Ile
mutation in the M2 gene of an H5N1 virus. The strong asso-
ciation between this mutation and Ser31Asn is also novel; the
first time it was detected was in Vietnamese isolates from 2003.
Interestingly, all Vietnamese H5N1 viruses isolated in 2004 con-
tained the dual Leu26Ile–Ser31Asn amantadine-resistance mu-
tations, and the amantadine-sensitive viruses isolated in 2005
were genetically associated with a sublineage believed to have
been introduced during 2005 (figure 1) [2].
The M2 sequences of H5N1 viruses from Japan, Korea, China,
Hong Kong, and Indonesia were also examined. No known re-
sistance-linked mutation was identified in isolates from poultry
outbreaks in Japan and Korea in late 2003. Of the 231 viruses
isolated in Hong Kong between 1997 and 2005 (221 from poultry
and 10 from infected humans), 33 (including 2 human isolates)
carried the Ser31Asn mutation, but only 1, A/Chicken/Hong
Kong/YU250/03, carried the dual Ser31Asn–Leu26Ile mutations
(table 1). Preliminary in vitro tests indicate that this virus is
resistant to amantadine; viral titers in culture supernatants were
not reduced by the highest drug concentration tested (500 mmol/
L), whereas replication of viruses lacking resistance mutations
was inhibited by the presence of 1–10 mmol/L amantadine. The
first time amantadine-resistance mutations were observed in
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Hong Kong avian H5N1 viruses was in 2002; none of 61 isolates
collected between 1997 and 2001 contained any of the mutations
for which we screened (figure 1 and data not shown).
The frequency of amantadine-resistant human H3N2 influ-
enza viruses isolated in Asia was recently reported to have in-
creased sharply in 2003, particularly in China [13]. To determine
whether a similar phenomenon had occurred in H5N1 viruses,
we screened isolates from China. Resistance-related mutations
were less common in isolates from China than in those from
Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia; 4.1% (5/123) of the Chinese
isolates carried Val27Ala, and 8.9% (11/123) carried Ser31Asn.
None contained the dual Leu26Ile–Ser31Asn mutations. As a
comparison, the M2 sequences of 220 H9N2 viruses isolated in
China and Hong Kong between 1976 and 2004 were examined
for amantadine-resistance mutations; 10 carried the Ser31Asn
mutation, and none carried the Leu26Ile mutation (data not
shown). H5N1 infection in humans has now been reported in
Indonesia [4], but only 2 of the 32 isolates screened had an
amantadine-resistance mutation (a single Ser31Asn substitu-
tion). The novel and distinct Leu26Ile–Ser31Asn mutation pat-
tern therefore appears to be geographically restricted to the 3
contiguous countries Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia, with
the exception of a single isolate identified in Hong Kong in 2003.
Discussion. Mutated viruses reportedly may either lose the
ability to bind M2 ion channel blockers, as with the Ser31Asn
substitution, or bind the drug but retain M2 function, as with
Val27Ala [14]. Because of the unavailability of viruses with only
the Leu26Ile mutation, the ability of the Leu26Ile mutation to
confer amantadine resistance has not yet been verified, and its
contribution to amantadine resistance or to other phenotypic
characteristics of isolates from Vietnam, Thailand, and Cam-
bodia remains to be elucidated. However, the presence of the
confirmed resistance mutation Ser31Asn suggests that isolates
with both the Leu26Ile and Ser31Asn mutations are likely to
be amantadine resistant; preliminary in vitro tests on a Hong
Kong isolate—A/Chicken/Hong Kong/YU250/03, which con-
tains dual mutations—indicate that this is indeed the case.
Although amantadine-resistant H5N1 viruses are present in
Asia, their distribution appears to be largely limited to Thailand,
Vietnam, and Cambodia. That most H5N1 isolates from China
and Indonesia are sensitive to amantadine is striking and per-
haps surprising, in view of the reportedly widespread admin-
istration of amantadine to farmed poultry in some countries.
The apparent geographical disparity in the susceptibility of
H5N1 isolates to amantadine is unexplained, although the con-
served pattern of mutations suggests that the Thai, Vietnamese,
and Cambodian viruses originated from a single virus intro-
duced into, or generated within, the region. Given that the
Ser31Asn–Leu26Ile motif was first identified in Vietnam in
2003, it appears that Vietnam might have been the location of
introduction or generation. Phylogenetic evidence suggests that
H5N1 viruses in Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia likely arose
as a result of the introduction of viruses from other affected
areas [2, 10]. This conclusion is further supported by the dis-
tribution of the dual mutation, which is present in almost all
viruses from the Vietnam/Thailand/Malaysia sublineage [2] and
which has otherwise been recorded only in 1 isolate from else-
where (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/YU250/03). Although it is not
known how the dual mutants observed in the present study
were generated, amantadine appears to retain the potential to
be useful in an H5N1 pandemic in the absence of a vaccine,
as a prophylactic agent [15] and as a component of combi-
nation antiviral therapy.
Most adamantane-resistant influenza viruses (70%–80%)
bear mutations at aa 31 of the M2 protein, whereas only 1%–
2% have mutations at aa 26 [9, 13]. Dual Leu26Ile and Ser31Asn
mutations are extremely rare; we found this dual motif in only
1 (A/Swine/Scotland/410440/94 [16]) of the 1307 publicly avail-
able influenza A sequences (including isolates from all species)
that we examined. The high incidence of Leu26Ile and its ex-
clusive association with Ser31Asn only in H5N1 isolates from
Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia suggest that viruses carry-
ing the dual mutations were stably selected, because no single
Leu26Ile or Ser31Asn mutants were found among resistant iso-
lates from these countries. Resistance mutations at other amino
acid positions (Val27Ala and Ala30Ser) were also rare in these
3 countries. Further, it is noteworthy that all available M2 se-
quences of H5N1 viruses isolated from humans in Vietnam carry
the dual Leu26Ile–Ser31Asn mutations. Additional investigation
is needed to elucidate the biological effect that the dual M2
mutations Leu26Ile and Ser31Asn have on the life cycle of the
H5N1 virus.
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